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Abstract
In a world that is developing fast, Africa's relative stagnation is a human tragedy that challenges the
development profession. Although climate and geography, and their effect on local institutions, are
not in Africa's favour, inappropriate policies (including neglect of agriculture) and weak institutions
figure more prominently in the explanation of slow growth. Recent evidence, however, points to
accelerated growth in many parts of Africa. Analysis of agriculture shows that adverse effects of nature
can be handled effectively, that efforts to develop and apply technologies for intensification in a variety
of farming systems are under way, but that sustained adoption by the mass of smallholders has not
sufficiently taken place. For that to happen, a variety of time- and location-specific complementary
actions - both public and private - are needed, based on a right mix of disciplinary knowledge. With
positive changes in governance and a revival of agricultural priorities in Africa, favourable conditions are
emerging for renewed and better targeted external aid to support agricultural development.
Additional keywords: development, governance, intensification
Introduction
During the second half of the 20th century, economic development has greatly
contributed to overcoming poverty, improved food security, better access to education
and health, and higher levels ofwelfare and choice. Spectacular advances at historically
unknown rates of growth were realized in China and Vietnam, and now in India as
well. As a result, millions of households were lifted out of poverty, and a new middle
class is emerging all over Asia. Developments in Latin America were mixed and more
modest. By any measure though, economic developments in Sub-Saharan Africa have
been dismal, with many countries showing no progress for more than one generation.
Africa's economic stagnation was accompanied by growing doubts and division
about the desired strategy and policies to reverse these adverse developments. The
lively discussions about the mixed outcome of the economic reforms propagated in
structural adjustment programmes since the 1980s raised new questions as to what
constitutes good governance, which factors structurally hamper the proper functioning
ofmarkets and what consequences this has for collective action. Examples of these
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'new' market failures are risks that cannot be covered so that futures markets and
long-term contracts are absent, high information and transaction costs giving rise to
alternative exchange mechanisms or institutions, or lack of social capital that causes
and perpetuates exclusion.
Of growing importance is the co-ordination issue, which plays a crucial role in the
development of technology for which critical mass is a necessary condition. But in
sectors with a multitude of small producers, such a critical mass does not come about
by itself and needs to be organized, but once present stimulates and attracts further
research and development. In this way, the build-up of expertise generates increasing
returns. Without public support, this process does not emerge.
Co-ordination has an interesting dynamic side as well, as illustrated by Hoff &
Stiglitz' (ZOOl) definition of developing countries: "regions that are on a different
production function and are differently organized than high-income countries". In
this structurally different configuration, multiple, i.e., low- and high-level equilibria
are conceivable. However, acquiring superior technology and developing better-
adapted institutions by themselves will not ensure that a higher-level equilibrium can
be reached. For that to happen, a society needs to successfully co-ordinate a variety
of time- and location-specific complementary actions. Designing and executing
these multiple interventions is not an easy task on a continent where markets and
governments often fail, and faces stiff competition from more popular and appealing
generic single programmes such as malaria eradication or fertilizer distribution.
These new analytical concepts from development theory have an important bearing
on agriculture and rural development as well. In this context Meier (ZOOl) mentions
the great damage that many African countries have inflicted on themselves by poor
price policies and neglect of infrastructure and support services. Although the welfare
cost of these policies was clearly exposed, it took a while before the political economy
of gainers and losers was properly recognized. Subsequent innovations in information,
risk and contract analysis at a much more disaggregate level have enriched the micro-
economics of rural markets and institutions. The recognition of high transaction costs
in rural commodity markets and a better understanding of complex linkages in factor
markets and related institutions greatly increased the understanding of household
decision-making and with it the effectiveness of outside interventions.
Not only have developments in Africa stagnated in a globalizing and rapidly
changing world, the continent has in many circles an image of doom and failure, with
petty incidents filling the tabloids, reminding us of the way India or Indonesia were
covered half a century ago (Guest, zo04). Can we with better analytical tools available
now, explain why such a geographical divide has occurred? Is the gloomy picture of
Africa really true? Is there something special or inevitable about Africa's stagnation?
Ifwe find some answers, are they helpful to influence developments in Africa? In
addressing these questions, the focus will be mainly on agriculture and the rural areas. It is
where most Africans live and where poverty is concentrated (Zeller & Johannsen, zo04).
Reflecting these questions, this article is organized as follows. First, some
explanations are offered for Africa's recent experience and disappointing performance
in a more general context. Next, we focus on agriculture, discuss a number of
development dilemmas typical for Africa, and contrast Africa's experience with that
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of most Asian countries. Particular attention is paid to the adoption and diffusion of
modern, high-yielding varieties, and it is indicated under what conditions a Green
Revolution type of agricultural intensification would be feasible in Africa. We then turn
to recent advances and new initiatives in agricultural development and discuss the role
international aid can play to accelerate current intensification efforts, recognizing its
dismal past effectiveness in Africa. The final chapter concludes.
Africa: some explanations
Neo-classical growth theory tells us that countries with similar features converge and
that latecomers catch up, like Ireland in the EU. If intrinsic country characteristics
are different, conditional convergence occurs, i.e., countries sharing the same group
features converge, but among groups there can be divergence. As Carter & Barrett
(2006) argue, ifAfrican countries would feature common growth-retarding factors,
there would be divergence and no catching-up between Africa and the rest of the world.
Examples of such factors abound: a low population density and diverse geography,
including long distances to the sea, causing low-density and expensive infrastructure.
As a result, markets are far less developed than elsewhere in the world. Complex
and diverse agro-ecological and climatic conditions unfavourably affect agriculture
and health, and cause large variations in yields. Historically, Africa has suffered
from slavery and institutional legacies of colonial rule, including ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, and more recently from cold war politics and the rapid spread of
HIVIAIDS. Policies of overregulated markets, heavy taxation of agriculture, and
wasteful spending of natural resource rents have been holding back development.
A second explanation rests on poverty traps related to thresholds that cause both
low- and high-level equilibria given a country's characteristics. To cross a minimum
threshold level of capital or income (where returns are locally increasing), one needs
a jump in technology, scale or nature of activity to reach a higher-level equilibrium on
another production function. Without a co-ordinated push in terms of resources and
adjustment of supporting institutions, the economy remains at a low-level equilibrium. It
is an often argued (e.g., Collier, 2006) and popularized (Sachs, 2005) case that financial
aid to supplement resources and technical aid to help reform institutions can be effective
to assist lifting a country out of a low-level equilibrium. At the aggregate level, however,
empirical evidence for such a 'big push' remains scant (Kraay & Raddatz, 2007).
Poverty traps are probably more relevant at the micro-level of households
where intrinsic characteristics like assets and location determine the possibilities
of accumulation to reach a high-level equilibrium. Under locally increasing returns
causing multiple equilibria, asset-poor households will be caught in a low-level
equilibrium and unable to catch up with their better-off neighbours. Examples of
increasing returns at low-income levels are plentiful: adoption of high-yielding
varieties, a shift to improved dairy cattle, off-farm salaried employment, and self-
employment like operating a van or a taxi. In these examples increasing returns reflect
characteristics of a new technology with higher input efficiency, a minimum scale, or
the ability to specialize and go for more high-risk activities. Low savings and education
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levels, the inability to access credit, and different forms of social exclusion are among
the factors explaining divergence among households.
The recent work by Escobal (zooS) is an excellent example of the dynamic interaction
between the divergent nature of a household's private assets and the provision of public
infrastructure investment. Contrary to popular belief, Escobal found for the Peruvian
Andes that the fruits of public investment in roads, education or health care lift the
return to assets of wealthier households to a high-level equilibrium, but hardly reach
the poor if their access to these public assets is not explicitly addressed. But if access is
improved, there are clear synergies to be achieved, causing increasing returns when the
right complementarities among different assets are sorted out, depending on time and
location. Though in a different context, the approach advocated by Sachs (zooS) for the
Millennium villages in Africa reflects similar considerations.
Driving forces
At the macro level, growth regressions have tried to establish which factors are likely
to explain Africa's slow growth. Reviewing these results, Collier & Gunning (1999)
showed that lack of social capital or cohesion comes out as the most important factor;
if combined with poor policies, it almost accounts for half of the growth shortfall.
Ethnic diversity is important in societies lacking political rights, but disappears as
an explanatory variable under more democratic regimes. Lack of openness to trade,
a matter of policy as well as geography, and lack of financial services matter, but to a
lesser extent. More important are deficient public services and infrastructure, which are
high-cost and often poorly and selectively delivered. Public employment creation and
the need to maintain an often narrow power base are at the root of this phenomenon.
Climate, geography and a dispersed population create considerable volatility, to which
terms of trade and policy variations can be added. Finally, though Africa received
substantial aid flows, there is little evidence of a positive net effect on growth.
Moving to evidence at the micro level, Collier & Gunning (1999) observed that
lack of market openness and rural social capital, the high cost of risk-coping strategies
(activity diversion, consumption smoothing by holding liquid assets), and poor public
services confirm the aggregate findings about Africa's stagnation. In their own words
(Collier & Gunning, 1999, p. 100) "Africa stagnated because its governments were
captured by a narrow elite that undermined markets and used public services to deliver
employment patronage. These policies reduced the returns on assets and increased the
already high risks private agents faced." As a result, Africa faced an outflow of financial
and human capital, and developed internally a variety of risk-coping mechanisms that
reduced growth. Traditional rural institutions that were once a rational and efficient
response to physical and socio-economic constraints did not sufficiently evolve to cope
with new demands. Dissemination oflearning and innovations remained therefore
limited, extension badly organized, and credit provision poor. The system of taxation
of international trade had a detrimental effect on agriculture. Some countries banned
private trade and introduced widespread controls on prices and quantities. Not
surprisingly, stories ofblack markets, smuggling, road blocks, and heavy evictions
proved a rich source for popular reporting in the media.
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Although climate and geography, and their influence on local institutions are not in
Africa's advantage, inappropriate policies and governance at both the macro and micro
level appear to figure more prominently in the explanation of slow growth. Focusing
especially on rural development Omamo (2003) and Mwabu & Thorbecke (2004)
arrived at similar conclusions: the physical environment in most ofAfrica is marked by
exceptional diversity, creating great disadvantages for Green Revolution technologies
that rely on standard technical packages for monocropping under controlled water
management. But despite high potential returns, investment in physical infrastructure
and agricultural research to address these issues has been widely neglected.
Co-variate crop risk has discouraged credit institutions in the lowland, semi-arid
areas, and savings were channelled in semi-liquid assets such as animals to maintain
consumption in hard times. In such an environment, agriculture remains trapped
in a low-productivity equilibrium. On top of that, the effects of policies have on the
whole been detrimental to the rural areas, the more so because incentives to resist the
exploitative policies were small. With weak cohesion outside local rural communities,
little investment by farmers in the land, and the prevalence of user over property rights,
peasant organizations have remained weak or absent.
Agriculture
Having touched on agriculture, let us elaborate a bit more the great divide between
Africa's allegedly stagnating agriculture and the successful developments elsewhere,
especially in Asia. Overall, most Africans south of the Sahara are hardly better off now
than at the time of independence half a century ago. At that time the average income in
Africa was twice as high as that in Asia. Now, the average income in South Asia is well
above that in Africa, and in East Asia even three times as high.
A similar trend can be observed for agriculture: measured by cereal yields, those in
Africa have slowly increased from 0.7 to 1.0 ton per ha, whereas in South Asia yields
have climbed to 2.5 and in East Asia to 4.5 tons per ha. At the time of independence, African
countries on the whole were self-sufficient in food, by now many are food importers and
recipients of food aid. A staggering 40% ofall Africans go hungry, and halfof Sub-Saharan
Africa is classified as extremely poor, i.e., surviving on less than I US$ a day.
In Africa, like in most of the developing world, poverty is concentrated in the rural
areas. Though urban slums catch the eye by their visibility, three quarters ofthe poor live
in rural areas where agriculture is a dominant but low-productivity sector, absorbing most
resources. In these circumstances, gains in agricultural productivity enable an increase
in food supply, reduce food prices, contribute to employment and generate resources for
non-agricultural development. Net food-buying households (more than halfof the rural
and all urban households) gain through lower food prices, and nominal wages, important
for development elsewhere, can therefore be kept in check. Net food-selling households
realize income gains if price declines remain in line with productivity increases. Such
developments are the more likely when agriculture growth stimulates other activities,
generating additional income and food demand. Ifnon-farm development is accompanied
by a tightening of the rural labour market, even more income gains will emerge.
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In the World Development Report 2008, Agriculture for Development (Anon., 2007), a
strong empirical case is made for the comparative advantage of agriculture to reduce
poverty. Econometric analysis over the last two decades for 42 developing countries
shows that for the poorest deciles in the expenditure distribution, a 1% GDP growth
in agriculture increases their income by more than 2.5%. A similar increase in non-
agricultural growth generates less than half of this effect (Christiaensen & Demery,
2007). At higher levels of income, the agricultural growth effect on poverty decreases,
but remains superior to non-farm activities. Taking cereal yields as a proxy for
agricultural productivity, its role in reducing poverty marks a contrasting experience
between South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. In South Asia, a steady increase in cereal
yields during the period 1987-2001 was accompanied by decreasing levels of poverty.
In Africa low cereal yields and high poverty hardly changed during the same period.
Earlier we concluded that unfavourable physical conditions and an anti-rural policy
bias go a long way in explaining Africa's slow (agricultural) development. The policy
bias has been aggravated by a dismal record in public underinvestment in African
agriculture. Public spending on African agriculture, including investment in R&D,
stands at an all-time low ofless than 7% of agricultural GDP, against n% in Asia and
almost 13% in Latin America. Donor support to agriculture in Africa has dwindled from
US$ 3-4 billion in the late 1980s to US$ I billion now. While the OECD countries
are subsidizing and protecting their farmers in ways that distort world markets,
African countries are denied trading opportunities equivalent to almost US$ 2 billion
in lost income, twice the size of these countries foreign assistance (Gabre-Madhin &
Haggblade, 2004; Anon., 2007). Policy bias is clearly not confined to Africa.
To avoid any misunderstanding, expansion of food staple production has increased
in Africa, but on the whole its rate of increase has been outstripped by population
growth. Given the low rate of yield increase, additional production has mainly come
from expanding the area cultivated and from shorter fallow periods, largely maintaining
conventional farming techniques. This is reflected by the low adoption rates of modern
crop varieties: on average 22% in Sub-Saharan Africa against 78% in South Asia and
84% in East Asia (Evenson & Gollin, 2003). Fertilizer use is minimal and irrigation
underutilized. No wonder soil degradation is becoming a major problem causing
further productivity losses.
An African dilemma
Why then - with an African food crisis imminent - is there so little increase in crop yields,
or in other words, why is a type of Green Revolution that triggers intensification not
happening in Africa? A common response (summarized in Anon., 2007, Box 2.2) to this
question points to Africa's low population density in relation to its land availability. Bringing
more land under cultivation, i.e., extensification, is then a rational response at the farm
level, rather than going for higher yielding, more expensive and risky inputs to increase
production on existing land. However, with the current high rates ofpopulation growth and
correcting for land quality, population densities in much ofAfrica now are approaching
those in Asia at the beginning of the Green Revolution. Based on these considerations,
there is no doubt that Africa ought to have its version ofa Green Revolution.
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Another reason relates to the earlier mentioned intrinsically diverse agro-ecological
conditions in Africa. As a result, Africa has a wide range of rain-fed farming systems
producing a broad range of staples. Asian Green Revolution technologies initially
focused on irrigated rice and wheat in fairly homogeneous environments. Transfer
to Africa therefore requires location-specific adjustments for a much broader range
of crops to realize the potential for yield increases. Obviously, the necessary R&D to
achieve this is costly and crucially depends on generous public funding from national
and international sources. But even if this potential would be realized, adoption by
farmers will of course depend on the effective provision of a variety of complementary
public and private inputs, proper marketing and favourable policy incentives.
An important contribution to a better understanding of the process of
intensification in African agriculture is the recent work by an African-Swedish
research collaboration of sociologists, geographers and economists (Djurfeldt et
a!', zooS). Based on a survey of more than 3000 households in more than 100
villages located in different agro-ecological environments of 8 African countries, and
supplemented with historical accounts of earlier African efforts to intensification, the
authors firmly concluded that modern varieties were and are being adopted in various
countries (see also Gabre-Madhin & Haggblade, zo04; Anon., zo07). The African
agro-ecology does pose constraints, but here an old adage of development theory
applies: it is the response to a constraint rather than the constraint itself that matters.
Technologies appropriate to Africa are more and more 'on the shelf' and returns to the
development of new ones are high.
Analysing the earlier successes of high-yielding varieties in Japan and post-war
East and South Asia, Djurfeldt et a!' (zooS) arrived at the conclusion that the Green
Revolution in Asia was a state-driven, market-mediated and smallfarmer based strategy
to attain self-sufficiency in food grains. The latter reflected both nationalistic and
international geo-political considerations, and was considered, or at least tolerated,
as a condition for rapid industrial growth. Foreign aid was accepted against the
background of these considerations and played an important role. Although mostly
driven by authoritarian regimes, participatory strategies in agriculture were common,
with successes counting heavily to legitimize the ruling regime. Providing public
R&D, infrastructure and institutional support, using markets effectively to channel
inputs and outputs, and reaching out to the millions of small family farms did not
come without resistance. In India it took a fierce debate with the powerful planners
supporting ample funding of heavy industry and import substitution. In Indonesia,
policy change was only possible after a dramatic change of regime.
The three characterizing elements of the successful process of adoption of modern
varieties in Asia have largely been absent in most ofAfrica. Historically, many present-
day African states "did not develop from within and in conflict with each other, ....
they function as members of the international state system" with the principle of non-
interference in internal affairs as a core element (Djurfeldt et a!', zooS' pp. 14-15).
Although most African states had no uncontested domestic power monopoly, their
stability was held up by the non-interference principle and international support. Left
to solve their domestic legitimacy problems, support was sought from the small urban
elite, the army and large cash crop producers. The majority of the population was thus
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excluded from the modernization process, and interventions were geared towards the
interest of a small elite, with an urban bias in budget allocations and markets distorted
in their favour. No wonder that the domestic reforms conditioned by the World Bank
in its structural adjustment programmes were viewed as violating non-interference
and met with fierce ideological resistance by the ruling elite. Having to rely on such a
narrow power base is a far cry from the Asian development state where leadership was
committed to broad-based and inclusive development on which the legitimacy of its
regime was ultimately based.
Are advances looming?
Putting the evidence on staple food production together, Sub-Saharan Africa
has certainly not been without growth, in particular for maize and cassava, but
intensification has been patchy, largely bypassing smallholders, and has not led to a
sustained increase in productivity. During and shortly after the colonial period, maize-
based hybridization technologies have spread from Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Kenya
over the sub-continent. Research on hybrid maize was initiated during the 1930S, and
since the 1950S a series of high-yielding varieties were released and adopted (Djurfeldt
et a!', zooS' chapter 5). However, after independence most African governments did
not perceive food self-sufficiency as a problem, and without much effort extensification
was assumed to take care of additional supply.
With steadily decreasing food prices on the world market food import became an
attractive altemative and food aid could always be counted on as a last resort. Moreover,
African states faced few extemal threats. With their limited internal legitimacy, willingness
and sometimes capacity to implement reforms, governments were understandably tempted
to avoid the demanding route of intensification. All this happened in the face ofmounting
evidence ofan increasing yield gap, illustrating the high potential ofnewly developed
technologies that were adjusted to the nature ofAfrican conditions.
The nature of this paradox has not gone unnoticed by a younger generation of
the African intelligentsia and policy-makers, or by the more informed part of the
international community. Numerous initiatives and changes before and around the turn
of the century have resulted in profound changes in governance, improved transparency
and participation, and in a more realistic view on African development (Owusu, zo03;
Anon., zo07). As a result, a wave of 'positive news' is now emerging, documenting
successes and emphasizing the opportunities for change. Building on long-standing
policy and research work by CGIAR in Africa, the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI) has made repeated efforts to make this information widely available
(Schioler, 1998; Haggblade, zo04). As in the Djurfeldt et a!. (zooS) study, micro-evidence
and an extensive expert survey reported by Gabre-Madhin & Haggblade (zo04) show that
modern varieties and improved practices are finally making an impact in Africa.
Maize breeding has had its ups and downs (following the withdrawal of fiscally
unsustainable subsidies in the 1980s), but across Africa farmers are now reported to
plant almost half their area to improved varieties. Improved disease-resistant clones of
cassava, developed during the past three decades, have been widely adopted and have
improved the lives of probably 100 million poor consumers and farm family members.
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Successes in on-farm breeding ofbananas in the central highlands of East Africa,
cotton in West Africa, rinderpest disease control, and new common bean varieties with
multiple stress resistance can be added. The New Rice for Africa (NERICA), a yield-
increasing, low-input variety, released a decade ago, is now cultivated on 200,000 ha,
a modest but promising start.
It is puzzling how these well-established micro findings contrast with the bleak
aggregate picture of African agriculture. Others, including the Centre for World Food
Studies (Keyzer & Van Wesenbeeck, 2006), have made similar observations, partly on
the basis of nutritional data. Gabre-Madhin & Haggblade (2004) hypothesized that
the paucity of agricultural sample frames and the difficulty of measuring minor crops
as well as crop output that is harvested all year, might well create a downward bias in
aggregating field data. If true, this would confirm that hunger in Africa, like elsewhere
in the world, is more a problem of poverty than of deficient availability.
To sustain these successes requires both improved technologies and favourable
production incentives. The IFPRI expert survey underlines in particular the widening
of technological options: three fourths of the stimuli to trigger agricultural change
involve the expansion of the farmer's physical opportunity set. As the most important
interventions are considered - in order of importance - (I) the development of new
technology itself, (2) improved access to it through superior inputs and extension, and (3)
increased farmer assets, ofwhich the latter two could be labelled socio-economic issues
as well. Improved policy and institutional incentives account for the remaining quarter,
though the social scientists in the survey come up with a substantially higher rating of
around two fifths. With science-based technology as a key driver of agricultural growth
(as economic growth theory incidentally tells us), the dramatic declines in agricultural
R&D funding (see e.g., Anon., 2007, chapter 7) are a clear threat indeed to much
needed future agricultural innovation in Africa.
Acquiring higher yields: recent research initiatives
The recent UN InterAcademy Council Report (Anon., 2004) on science and technology
strategies to improve agricultural productivity in Africa is a bold attempt to specify
high-yielding technologies to raise productivity in a sustainable way and contribute to
improved food security. The report stresses the earlier factors that differentiate farming
systems in Africa from those in Asia (diverse, mainly rain-fed systems on weathered
soils, rudimentary infrastructure, weak institutions and biased policies). The diversity
of farming systems and crop and livestock variety means that Africa lacks the scale
advantages in the development and diffusion of new technologies, which necessitates a
higher and more costly research effort. Thanks to past research efforts, adoption of new
varieties is taking place, roughly now at a pace comparable with that of a generation
ago in Asia (Anon., 2004, p. 160).
Out of many distinct farming systems identified by the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) - varying though across and within the
major agro-ecological zones ofAfrica - four systems have been selected that have the
greatest potential for improving productivity and reducing malnutrition. These systems
are (I) a maize-based mixed system, (2) a cereal/root crop mixed system, (3) an irrigated
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system, and (4) a tree crop-based system. All consist of multiple cropping systems, with
livestock and off-farm activities in some. Based on a production-ecology approach, a
range of technological options is then specified taking into account relevant constraints
and goals. The options are translated into pilots, and due attention is paid to issues of
institution building, the need for more extensive training of new African agricultural
scientists, market enhancement and farmer participation. Constraints in these areas
are well analysed and discussed, but do not directly influence the choice of techniques.
Research strategies and policies for Africa are realistically discussed. On
the domestic front no secret is made of the lack of priority for R&D by African
governments themselves. Counting the agricultural priorities listed in 24 African
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (Roseboom et a!', 2004) shows that research
appears in only 4 documents, only slightly better than disaster management, which
comes last. (Ironically, diversification out of agriculture has one of the highest scores.)
Generous past donor funding may have played a role here, but the low domestic
priority accorded to agricultural research may well have backfired and given donors an
excuse for complacency. This low priority is in painful contrast to the consistently high
rates of returns for agricultural R&D in Africa: almost four fifths of the programmes
promise returns in excess of 20% (Anon., 2004, p. 158, based on IFPRI data).
Adoption in an imperfect environment
The approach followed in the InterAcademy Report (Anon., 2004) offers an excellent
window of opportunities for further intensification efforts all over Africa. It shows
convincingly that high-yielding varieties appropriate to the diverse conditions ofAfrican
agriculture are within reach and can be gainfully applied. However, having stated a
good case how sure are we that different types of farmers working in an environment of
incomplete markets and institutions and often adverse policies, are likely to adopt the
proposed technologies, and if so which ones? Can we convince governments that it is in
their interest to support this process, and reform their policies accordingly? It is here that
the 'one-quarter' or 'two fifths' contribution ofand interaction with social scientists is
essential and where development economics has made major contributions.
Farm households are heterogeneous in terms of assets and livelihoods. Their
ability to access knowledge, modern inputs and finance differs, some are small
and subsistence-oriented, other ones hesitate to take risk, the additional produce
needs more labour, and then proper marketing to prevent price falls. But even if
intensification promises high returns, off-farm work and migration may be even
more rewarding. Under high transaction costs in product markets and an imperfectly
functioning labour and credit market, a price hike for a cash crop may have little effect
on its output when the farmer cannot divert family labour out of food crops. This may
happen when the farm household cannot rely on additional (hired) labour or on the
food market to make up for any deficit. Intensification would help, but if that requires
more cash inputs like fertilizer or brings more risk, lack of credit or the absence of
fertilizer traders will stall adoption.
Empirical findings confirm this as Bagamba (2007) found in the case of banana
production in Uganda: either attractive off-farm employment near the towns or failing
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markets in the countryside drove farmers partly away from remunerative banana
production. For Kenya, Salasya (2005) found crop output to be hardly responsive
to fertilizer prices because labour was not available at affordable prices. But even
where more labour was accessible, farmers were found to underuse fertilizer, in full
knowledge of its beneficial effect, because of failing credit facilities.
Determining the impact of technological innovations is therefore a truly Sisyphean
task that requires careful modelling work to account for all these considerations. One
way to do this is to start out from observed household behaviour and to model, in
close co-operation with biophysical colleagues, the agro-ecological and socio-economic
conditions in so-called bioeconomic models that enable scenario analysis. Such an
analysis can simulate and increase the understanding of adoption behaviour, the
effect of policy interventions on technology choice, the effect of failing markets and
institutions, trade-offs between goals expressing efficiency, equity and sustainability,
and dilemmas such as the cost of removing a constraint, say finance, versus the
adoption of a second-best technology that needs less finance for its adoption.
Multidisciplinary, bioeconomic work of this type has been applied to the humid
Atlantic Zone of Costa Rica (Bouman et a!., 2000) with a strong focus on ecological
impacts, to the semi-arid cotton zone of Mali (Kuyvenhoven et a!., 1998a) to better
understand the relation between food security and natural resource management, and
recently to the problems ofless-favoured areas (Anon., 2007, chapter 8; Ruben et a!.,
2007), home to hundreds ofmillions of people where the gainful options for competitive
high-yielding varieties are much more limited. These and other studies (Kuyvenhoven
et a!., 1998b) show how both agro-ecological and socio-economic factors determine the
choice and effect of technology. The results are also relevant to agenda setting in national
agricultural research institutes. After a socio-economic screening of the technical
windows of opportunities, more focused questions about promising options can be
asked. In addition, for those technologies likely to be adopted, indications can be given
of the complementary measures needed to make intensification a success.
Adding supportive policies, markets and institutions
It is in the field of the necessary policy and institutional incentives for intensification
that the World Development Report 2008 (Anon., 2007) makes a refreshing contribution,
one that can be considered complementary to the InterAcademy Report (Anon., 2004).
A few examples illustrate its relevance for the agriculture-based economies ofAfrica.
First and foremost, Africa is poorly served by infrastructure, in particular roads. As a
result, transportation costs are higher than in the rest of the world, reducing producer
prices and incentives, making essential inputs expensive if available at all, and hence
severely constraining market participation and competitiveness. Many state-run
market institutions proved ineffective and have either disappeared or were reformed
and privatized. But, in IFPRI's words, the road to more effective marketing has only
been half travelled (Van Tilburg et a!., 2000; Kherallah et a!., 2002), leaving important
market failures unresolved at great cost. As much research has shown (e.g., Fan &
Hazell, 2001; Fan & Chan-Kang, 2004; Escobal & Torero, 2005), improving transport
unleashes numerous new activities, greatly improves labour supply, and makes one of
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the highest contributions to poverty reduction.
After the demise and reform of institutions during the period of structural
adjustment, innovations needed to improve agricultural input supply have proven
controversial, in particular those related to financial services, seed and fertilizer. No
golden bullets from theory are on offer here and a search for best practices characterizes
the current debate. Rural credit stands out here: high information and enforcement costs
keep commercial banks at bay. Local savings and loan association may then fill the need
for credit, but these associations are selective, with membership fragmented along lines
oflocation, kin- or ethnic-based networks, or assets. The strongest members of society
do not participate because they can access the bank, and the weakest are unwelcome
because they increase risk. Moreover, poor farmers are often unwilling to run the risk
oflosing collateral. Given the seasonality in agriculture, the need to pre-finance inputs
and transition requirements when moving to higher-value crops, the cost of financial
constraints for smallholders in terms ofopportunities foregone can be huge (Anon.,
zo07, chapter 6) and there is great need for institutional innovations.
Microfinance has proven successful when loans can be used for a diversity of short-
term activities, but does not work well when most producers are subject to common
weather risks and land markets are hardly developed. Innovations might focus on
other collateral assets than land such as standing crops, or to open up the possibility to
mobilize savings. In this way microfinance can then possibly be linked to conventional
banking institutions through the creation of reputation collateral to improve client
selection. But this does not reduce weather or price risk. Alternatively, public
agricultural banks can be reformed, learning from past failures, or local financial co-
operatives be strengthened.
Seed and fertilizer markets are complicated markets where demand is highly variable
in time and space, and the lack of economies of scale in supply and distribution cause
high logistics and financing costs in all African countries. Consequently, farm gate
input prices in Africa can be three times as high as in the rest of the world. Coupled
with relatively low agricultural output prices and limited credit, adoption of modern
varieties will then be problematic indeed. Public interventions in seed and fertilizer
markets have often failed or became financially unsustainable, so that current
efforts to improve markets focus on public private partnerships in input distribution
systems. Novel schemes involving (private) foundations, NGOs, public plant breeding
and private seed producers and agro-dealers are being worked out in search of best
practices (Morris et a!', zo07). New challenges are arising here as much of the research
in biotechnology and genetic modification is done by the private sector, with new
varieties patented and not easily accessible, if relevant, to the poor (Pingali, zo07).
Alternative approaches
Before winding up the discussion on the possibilities ofyield improvement in Africa,
it needs to be emphasized that its contribution to poverty reduction is one among
several rural livelihood strategies. Observing degrees of farm income diversification
of one third (for low-income households) to more than one half (for the richer ones),
Ellis (zooS) argues that these off-farm labour- and migration-led strategies are puzzling
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because they are not driven by agricultural success, as conventional theory would
predict, but by agricultural failure. An illustration of the latter is the extra-ordinary
share of households' home consumption, and hence their limited market participation.
Small domestic markets that are characterized by price instability, declining real
output prices, adverse agricultural policies in the parastatal era followed by the market
uncertainties and institutional vacuum after the reforms that were supposed to correct
earlier state failures, have convinced rural households over the years that a strategy of
food self-sufficiency and diversification would be best for them.
Diversification, Ellis (zooS) claims, has gone far beyond the classical reasons of risk
and seasonality and recently cash needs, and has become a paradox in development.
With households opting for non-farm strategies the livelihood school argues that
migration and urbanization should be supported much more actively as contributing
to possible poles of rapid growth. Without vibrant exports and increasing agricultural
productivity, the incomes to be generated in industry and services to sustain rapid non-
food growth remain a challenge, but Ellis' criticism of an easy optimistic agricultural
stance on poverty reduction is a healthy reminder that farm households have more
options than farming. Better seeds compete with better mobile phones.
Without subscribing to Ellis' involution argument, the recent World Development
Report zo08 (Anon., zo07) reflects these considerations in a mix of productivity-
enhancing and diversification arguments. For the agriculture-based economies that
characterize most of Africa, it recommends a farm strategy that facilitates market chain
development, promotes smallholder competitiveness and market entry, improves the
productivity of subsistence farmers and ensures safety nets, and promotes non-farm
employment and migration through improved labour skills. For agriculture, this puts a
heavy co-ordination burden on the shoulders of African governments and donors. It is
their responsibility to develop and fund well-balanced technology and policy packages
that provide better seeds, roads, credit or knowledge. To shy away from this task, as so
many - including the Dutch development administration have done - is no option.
Aid
Development aid is generously provided to Africa in many modalities and for many
purposes. Most of it comes, economically speaking, for free or at below-market
costs, and the competition for donor funds is fierce. In a rational world, with agreed
development criteria like the Millennium Development Goals, aid would be allocated
where it is most needed according to the best scoring proposals so as to maximize its
effectiveness. As we know, reality is different. Aid serves purposes that are not related
to development, and many, including academics, doubt its usefulness. If agricultural
R&D programmes for Africa argue for increased support, as they do, they face an uphill
battle: on the domestic front, with donors, and with aid sceptics.
Aid sceptics and critics such as Easterly (zo06) argue that aid tends to increase
public consumption rather than investment, keeps bad governments in power and
postpones reforms, enriches corrupt elites, perpetuates costly aid lobbies, reduces the
recipient's own incentives and initiatives, creates dependency, and leads to 'Dutch
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disease' through appreciation of the exchange rate that harms export. It provides a
rich source of inspiration for the popular media. Aid proponents, from the passionate
Sachs (zooS) to the measured Collier (zo07), emphasize the resource- and expertise-
enhancing role of aid, and point to the numerous successes in terms of countries and
programmes (the Green Revolution created an international public good largely funded
by aid). With aid having such opposing effects and being one factor among many
contributing to development, empirical estimates of aid effectiveness are not only
problematic, but can have any outcome. What matters, is to find modalities that favour
the positive and minimize the negative effects of aid.
However, finding the right aid modalities is complicated by the position developing
countries take. As Collier (zo06) explains, technical assistance is criticized as expensive
ifnot wasteful. But it has proven helpful in support of reforms and post-conflict recon-
struction. Project aid is considered un-co-ordinated and requiring far too much bureau-
cracy. Projects can add to public goods though, but their visibility should not be confused
with accountability as donors and NGOs claim. Because of fungibility of resources, most
donor-funded projects would have been undertaken anyhow. Programme aid and debt
relief normally come with conditions that encroach on the recipient governments' own
autonomy. And even proponents ofaid see it as subject to diminishing returns, a point
that most aid flows to African countries may well have reached. So it is useful to look
first at recent aid performance, draw some lessons, and apply them to the case for more
international support for agricultural intensification in Africa.
Aid performance
The last decade has seen a wealth ofempirical work using aggregate data trying to establish
whether aid is effective (for summaries see Collier, zo06; Goderis & Verbon, zo06).
Whereas some studies find that aid is, on average, not effective, most studies now find that
aid does improve growth. Aid effectiveness is claimed by some regardless ofthe domestic
policy environment, but subject to diminishing returns; others emphasize its conditionality
on good (economic) policies and governance. The latter position, which is by no means
uncontroversial, is shared by the World Bank and a number ofbilateral donors. Other
findings point to a high effectiveness ofaid after natural disasters, price shocks causing
terms of trade losses, and during reconstruction efforts after violent conflicts and war.
Dalgaard et al. (zo04) have stirred up a fierce debate with their finding that aid
is effective, but less so in tropical, agriculture-based countries, of which there are
many in Africa. The authors suggest that adverse geography and climate in the form
of tropical land, diseases or being landlocked might playa role here. They also refer
to the explanation of Acemoglu et al. (ZOOl), who related geography to the nature of
institutions: areas with high mortality rates for European settlers had few incentives to
pay attention to lasting institutions. Dalgaard et al. (zo04, p. ZII) concede that it is hard
to believe that aid would be less effective in the tropics. They hypothesized that tropical
areas may have particular needs in terms of foreign assistance that have so far not been
met. We think we have identified some of those needs in the foregoing.
Aid conditionality is another contentious issue. Although resisted, the right
application of conditionality can be defended on rational and even moral grounds.
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Altruistic, unconditional aid is likely to act as an implicit tax on own initiatives, as the
disincentive effects of for instance food aid show (Barrett, 2002). In contrast to ex ante
conditionality based on promises, ex post conditionality based on good governance or
desired outcomes appears to be working well. During the last decade this approach
has enhanced aid effectiveness through selectivity in the choice of countries (Dollar
& Levine, 2006) and aid allocations that are more in line with the Millennium
Development Goals (Baulch, 2006).
Selectivity requires a degree of political courage though, and creates a dilemma
where poverty and poor governance go together. In such a situation, policy contagion
can help: successful reforms, and performance in countries supported by aid may well
inspire neighbours to rethink their development strategy (as in the case ofVietnam,
and even India observing China's performance). Mosley et al. (2004) modified the
verdict on ex ante conditionality by proposing another, 'third' way of new conditionality
based on a policy dialogue that respects the recipient country's priorities and focuses
aid on pro-poor public expenditures to enhance development. Their proposal would
further improve aid effectiveness and at the same time be able to influence policies.
Africa and aid
Turning in more detail to Africa, there is no doubt that past aid flows during the cold war
era have had a dismal record (Collier & Gunning, 1999, P.74; Sundberg & Gelb, 2006, p.
14). However, Collier (2006) warned for too much pessimism. Comparing the impact of
aid flows with that of the unconditional natural resource rents, particularly oil, the impact
of aid, thanks to its different modalities and conditionality, turns out to be far superior.
Not only was "the growth rate of the non-oil part ofAfrican oil exporters ... identical to
the rest ofAfrica", resource rents also undermined democracy and the rule oflaw by
making patronage on a large scale financially possible (Collier, 2006, pp. 1482-1484),
the so-called resource curse. Without aid, Africa may therefore well have fared worse.
At the micro level there is ample evidence that aid is working now. Recent
evaluations of projects funded by the World Bank show returns for Africa at par with
the rest of the world, with high scores of over 20% for transport and communications,
and agriculture. Moreover, the quality of donor-supported agricultural lending has
improved markedly during the past decade (Anon., 2007, chapter II).
At the level of governance, changes are encouraging. African countries, though
not all, have made substantial improvements, as measured by indicators of civil
liberties, rule oflaw, policy and institutions (Collier, 2006; Dollar & Levine, 2006). A
first beginning of a policy peer review has been made through the New Partnership
for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and donors, though not all, are succeeding in
making aid more poverty-effective by proper selection procedures. African economic
performance is finally catching up, although the role of improved governance and
external assistance needs more time and effort to have a lasting impact
Agriculture and development
Where does this leave the case for further assistance to agricultural intensification in
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Africa? With estimated returns to agricultural R&D high and realized returns in agriculture
and rural infrastructure more than satisfactory, there is little doubt that substantially more
resources can be gainfully absorbed. For most of these activities, however, those who make
the cost to develop them cannot be expected to fully appropriate the benefits. These services
need therefore public funding, although they can be, and sometimes are, provided by the
private sector under a proper regulatory framework.
However, long-term investments compete unfavourably with public spending
that promises quick results or with input subsidies that are often captured by a small
elite oflarge farmers. The until recently depressed prices on many agricultural world
markets are not an encouraging signal either. Many governments, especially of smaller
countries, count on the spillover of R&D by others (Anon., 2007, chapter 7). Given
Africa's heterogeneous agriculture, the potential to capture spillovers are smaller than
elsewhere, but due to the small country size in Africa, national agricultural research
systems are fragmented, lack scale and are either too expensive or ineffective.
A stronger domestic commitment and budget priority for agriculture, better
integrated markets, regional co-operation to capture scale economies in research,
and strong links with international agricultural research centres therefore appear
necessary conditions to justify more external assistance. There are encouraging signs
that African governments are finally committed to increase their own efforts to focus
on agriculture-led growth and poverty reduction under the Comprehensive Africa
Agriculture Development Programme ofNEPAD. Coupled with better training and
institutional reforms, these initiatives will enable the strengthening of the capacity of
African countries' agricultural administration, and a better balance between domestic
and external funding. Despite the relatively low levels of donor support, in several
countries that balance is currently too much biased towards external funding.
Donors could assist in this process, provided their priorities support it and they are
willing to co-ordinate their own programmes better. But they too have to cope with the
requisite of immediacy, visibility, appeal, and electoral reward, certainly in the eyes of
the media. Long-term investments in agriculture (including markets, rural finance,
research and extension) and infrastructure (irrigation, roads, transport, power, and
telecommunications) compete with social programmes and emergency aid, and for
some NGOs with the obvious visibility of schools, medical programmes or water wells.
The situation for agricultural R&D is further complicated by the comparatively large
amount of maintenance research on breeding for pests and diseases that is needed to
retain current yield levels. One third to one half of agricultural R&D may be needed for
this purpose, a little known fact to most people.
Since the turn of the millennium, however, the prospects for donor support
look better. Both developing and developed countries have come to recognize more
explicitly the importance of agriculture for development (the new Dutch Minister for
Development Co-operation has included agriculture among his priorities, a hopeful
sign after many years of neglect). Markets for high-value products and biofuels are
rapidly expanding, and the OECD countries have started to reform their farm policies,
albeit on a modest scale.
Within Africa, decentralization, farmer (including women) empowerment, and
public-private partnerships are coming up, signalling better prospects for a market-
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oriented, small farmer strategy. Challenging options are emerging: decentralized
approaches to plant breeding and varietal selection involving farmers at an early
stage can reduce development and dissemination of new and high-yielding varieties
from 10-15 to 5-7 years. Commercially viable FM radio services, cell phones and
solar-powered internet services nowadays convey price and market information that
substantially lowers the transaction costs of poor farmers in dealing with traders.
Private sector involvement, including NGOs, in extension, rural credit, technical
and marketing advice has in many countries lifted the quality and timing of service
delivery. The rapid development ofvalue chains has opened up export opportunities
for farmers who a decade ago were only serving local markets and hesitant to adopt
high-yielding crop varieties. But all this should not distract from the need to justify and
mobilize continued external assistance to co-fund public goods and expertise based
on the classical arguments of evidence- and science-based policy, proper lobbying and
leadership that is able to build political capital and shows results.
Concluding remarks
In a world that is developing fast, Africa's relative stagnation is a human tragedy that
challenges the development profession. Economic theory explains how areas that
feature common growth-retarding factors can diverge from and fail to catch up with the
rest of the world. Although climate and geography, and their effect on local institutions
are not in Africa's advantage, inappropriate policies and weak institutions, i.e., bad
governance, appear to figure more prominently in the explanation of slow growth.
Media coverage emphasizing failures has not added to Africa's image, but many
examples of successes documented by experts have gone unreported, creating
confusion about the real state of affairs. So have poor statistics. Visible achievements
at the micro level often do not show up at more aggregate levels, which complicates
issues like food security, child malnutrition and urban poverty. Recent evidence of
accelerated growth in most ofAfrica clearly contradicts the image of gloom, but still
has to find its way outside the circle of development experts.
Analysing the developments of Africa's largest sector, agriculture, and comparing it
with the successes of the Green Revolution in Asia, illustrates that the common factors
explaining Africa's disappointing performance are not necessarily typical for Africa,
although the intensity with which they constrain development appear to be stronger
than elsewhere. These circumstances create serious poverty traps and cause initially
higher costs to address the growth-retarding constraints. Analysis of the current state
of affairs in agriculture shows that the adverse effects of nature can be handled, that
efforts to develop and apply technology for intensification in a variety of farming
systems are under way, but that sustained adoption by the mass of smallholder farmers
has not sufficiently taken place.
It is probably here that the best lessons can be learned from the Asian Green
Revolution: no successful distribution of technological innovations like high-yielding
and more resistant varieties is possible without the complementary actions, both
private and public, that make it attractive and justifiable to adopt new varieties and
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practices. As these activity packages are likely to be location- and time-specific, that is
not an easy task. How precisely to cover risk, make credit available, target subsidies, get
fertilizers, find new marketing outlets, have better roads and provide more education
and health facilities is analytically demanding, but impressive expertise has been built
up and best practices (not to be confused with social engineering) are emerging.
Another lesson is the recognition that for agricultural intensification to succeed, the
right mix of disciplines is needed, based on fruitful co-operation and mutual awareness
of the contribution of natural and social sciences. Several CGIAR centres, often in
combination with universities, international NGOs and philanthropic foundations have
made a promising start with this type ofwork. It is illustrative that a recent initiative of
the Rockefeller and Gates Foundations to help develop new varieties suited to African
conditions has an almost 50/50 split of research funding for breeding and the entire
distribution system.
The effective implementation of channelling the right amount of funds into
agricultural R&D, selecting appropriate policies and public sector investment, and
targeting external assistance is a tall order for good governance. But promising signs
are emerging in several African countries, showing growing democratization, more
transparent public sector management, decentralization, and farmer empowerment.
Old ways die hard, certainly in politics, embedded as they are in vested interests, but
a move away by a new generation of politicians from patronage and serving narrow
interests is visible. External aid, ineffective in the past, has found a new architecture
that is much better targeted towards poverty alleviation and supportive of efforts to
improve governance.
Note
The present text is an extended version of the author's farewell address as professor of
development economics at Wageningen University.
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